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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
DISCONNECTION OF
TERRITORY FROM LAYTON
CITY, A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH

Case No.
12456

BRIEF 0'F APP·ELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for disconnection of territory from
Layton City under Title 10, Chapter 4, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court ordered disconnection of the territory.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the decree granting disconnection and an order directing the entry of a decree
denying disconnection.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Reference in this brief to petitioner refers to Rober
D. Sawyer, since he was the principal agent and manage
for the partnership owner of the tract in question.

On July 19, 1961, petitioner appeared before th
Layton City Planning Commission with a preliminar
drawing of "Rolling Oaks" subdivision, a proposed su~
division of land located east of the main part of Layto1
City (R. 53). Discussion ensued regarding lot sizes, fi
nancing, water easements, sewers, drainage, type o
homes to be built, the property's location in the Hill Ai
Force Base flight path with attendant requirement fo
less dense housing, road grading, tie-in with existin,
roads, setback requirements, and dedication of walkway:
Mr. Sawyer was assured that the Layton City Plannin.
Commission shared his views about maintaining the zor
ing for high quality housing in the area. He was told th
commission did not oppose his request for approval c
the proposed subdivision. He stated he wished to develo
as fast as possible, although completion of developmer
was programmed for five to eight years. An appointmer
was set for a planning commission representative t
meet Mr. Sawyer eight days later and assist him with a:
details, particularly with his roads in relation to the La)
ton City master road plan. Mr. Sawyer was apprised c
requirements for the filing of a final preliminary plat.
Layton City then heard nothing at all from Mr. Sa'VI
yer for seven years.
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In March 1968 petitioner filed this action in the district court to disconnect eighty acres from Layton City
and transfer it into East Layton Town. Upon the hearing
of the action, the district court entered an order disconnecting the eighty-acre tract in question.
Reference to other material facts is made in the points
of the argument herein, and no useful purpose would be
served by duplicate reference here.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATUTE, BROAD IN ITS TERMS, MUST TAKE
CONTENT FROM PAST DECISIONS OF THIS COURT
AND FROM COURTS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS.
Our tradition is that our government is one of laws
and not of men. For the most part, our legislative enactments are in accord with this principle and give adequate
standards for the measurement of conduct or performance.
But the statute which is pertinent here is an exception. It
says, in part:
If the court finds . . . that justice and equity require that such territory or any part thereof should
be disconnected from such city or town, it shall
appoint three disinterested persons as commissioners . . . (Sec. 10-4-2, U.C.A. 1953, emphasis added)

What are "justice" and "equity"? These abstractions should always be applied in whatever business
comes before the courts. Normally there is involved a
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cause of action based on familiar legal principles, or a
statute which supplies definite criteria. Both are lacking
here. What is just and equitable to a district judge sitting
in one court on a given day may be very different from
the ideas of a different judge in a different court on the
same day. Without ascertainable standards, we get the
judgment of men and not control by laws.
If that statute, therefore, is not to be arbitrarily applied it must be given form and content by the past decisions of this court. Only by reading into it the standards established in past decisions, including those from
other jurisdictions, can we reach some conclusions as to
when territory should be severed from a city and when it
should not be.

The earliest Utah decision is Young v. Salt Lake
City, 24 U. 321, 67 P. 1066 (1902). Disconnection was
allowed. It appeared that:
( 1) The land was not platted
(2) The land was not situated so as to render it desirable that it be platted to be used for residential or business purposes
(3) It was situated five miles from the business section of the city
(4) The land was unfit for municipal or residential
purposes
( 5) The land had not and could not receive fire or
police protection or other municipal benefits of any kind.
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Next came In re Fullmer, 33 U. 43, 92 P. 768 ( 1907).
Here, the land was agricultural, and received "no direct
or appreciable benefit". The Town of Mapleton asserted
unconstitutional delegation of legislative function, which
was rejected on the authority of Young, and disconnection
was allowed.
The next case is Christensen v. Town of Clearfield,
66 U. 455, 243 P. 376 (1926), in which the 681-acre tract
in question was wholly agricultural land, located one to
two miles from the four or five buildings making up the
center of town. It was unplatted and so situated as to
render it undesirable for platting. It received no fire protection, no benefit from police protection, and had its
own water supply. The disconnection was affirmed on
the authority of Fullmer.
The following year this court decided In re Town of
Smithfield, 70 U. 564, 262 P. 105 (1927). The detached
tracts were agricultural lands receiving no direct or appreciable benefit. Decision was affirmed on the authority
of Fullmer and Christensen.
A significant decision is In re Chief Consolidated
Mining Co., 71 U. 430, 266 P.1044 (1928), which involved lands in Mammoth City, Juab County. The majority
of the lands here detached by the lower court were not
agricultural but were mining areas. This court reversed
the district court as to the mining areas and affirmed as
to the level areas with brush growth on them. The court
found that Mammoth City had shown no population
growth in eight years and pointed to the fact that there

;

was no evidence to indicate any increase in population.
It observed that there was no reason to anticipate that
the area allowed to remain detached "will be required for
an extension of the residential portion of the city."
A tract of 52.5 acres was disconnected from the Town
of Moab by the district court in Application of Peterson,
92 U. 212, 66 P.2d 1195 (1937). On appeal this court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the findings
and decree. The detached territory was used exclusivly
for agricultural purposes, having been used for no other
purpose than to raise hay and other farm products. The
city's sewer system could not serve the land, and a private
water supply was available to it. The town's business
section was about a mile away. The town had made no
substantial growth in population for many years, and
"there is no prospect for any immediate increase in the
future."
In Howard v. Town of North Salt Lake, 7 U.2d 278,
323 P.2d 261 (1958), this court dealt with the question
whether a town which annexed an area seven times its
original area could compel all of the new area to remain
in the town solely for tax revenue. The disconnection
was affirmed on appeal. The severed property was basically industrial and constituted 61 % of the town's total
valuation before the severance. The town was incapable
of supplying water to the property owners, particularly to
the oil refinery. The town had no fire fighting facilities
and had no garbage pickup within the disconnected area.
The district court found that the disconnected territory
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did not receive and within the foreseeable future would
not receive any substantial benefit from the town.

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. City of Bingham Canyon,
18 U.2d 60, 415 P.2d 209 (1966) is the most recent case on
disconnection decided by this court. In this case the severed property mothered the city instead of vice versa. The
severed property was 90% of the city, which had experienced a population drop from 3,200 people in 1930 to
74 people in 1966. The severance was affirmed.
Upon analysis, the foregoing cases fall into two categories:
(1) Those in which the disconnected land was agri-

cultural and unplatted, and there was no prospect it
would be needed for the growth of the town, and
(2) Those in which the property was commercial or
industrial and the town was unable to serve it adequately.
The case at bar falls into neither category, but instead presents a novel question to this court. That question is:
Where a 160-acre tract of prime residential land lies
one-half in one municipality and one-half in the adjoining municipality and the land has been platted and part
of the plat recorded and the city from which 80 acres is
proposed to be severed has a population of 13,621 and a
growth rate of 57% since the prior ten-year census, and at
such time as the need for services exists the city can supply
all needed services and is willing to do so, and the town
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into which it is proposed to be transferred cannot supply
municipal services, should such 80-acre tract be disconnected?
It seems clear that the answer should be, No.
Courts in other jurisdictions have dealt with this
same problem. In citing the cases that follow, counsel
does not represent that they are decided under statutes
like the Utah statute. In most cases, the statute is either
different substantively or procedurally, but the general
principles enunciated .have application to the case before
the court.
The Nebraska statute also employs the criteria of
"justice and equity," and decisions from that state are
helpful in construing our statute. In Shelton Grain &
Supply Co. v. Village of Shelton (Neb. 1965) 134 N.W.
2d 815, the court was concerned with an 11.635 acre
tract of land on the village's east boundary, with U.S.
Highway 30 on the north and the Union Pacific Railroad right-of-way on the south. There were grain storage bins on the parcel; the only ingress to the tract was on
two roads which entered through the county on the east
end of the tract. The applicable Nebraska statute, Sec.
17-414, R.R.S. 1943, provided for review and trial de
novo in the Supreme Court. The plaintiff contended that
the tract was used exclusively for agricultural purposes
and that it received few or no benefits from the village.
No water or sewer from the village came to any part of
the tract; there was no village street to the tract. The tract
8

owner argued that it received no snow removal, police, or
fire protection, and it was geographically separated from
the village by the highway and the railroad right-of-way.
The village put in evidence that it received police protection and snow removal and had never requested water or
sewer. The village offered fire protection to it also.
The court found that the village was the focal center
of the farming area, and that plaintiff's business operations were benefitted by the centralization of the community interests. The court held that the operation of the
grain storage bins was a commercial enterprise, and therefore the lands were not exclusively used for agricultural
purposes. The growth of the village, though not great,
was in the direction of the acreage. The court found that
there was a sufficient community of interest between the
tract and the village to sustain the lower court in retaining the tract within the corporate limits of the village.
In Creery v. Town of Okoboji (Iowa 1934) 253

N.W. 810, the defendant resort town had a permanent
population of 178 but a summer population of from 1500
to 2500. The town was laid out and platted along a lake
shore, about four and one-half miles long and between
one-fourth and one mile wide. The business section of
the town was in the south end; owners of about half of
the territory in the north end sought to have it severed.
Many of the largest and best homes were within that
north end tract. In denying severance, the court said: "In
most of the cases awarding a severance, it appears that
the land sought to be excluded was used almost wholly
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if not entirely for agricultural purposes; that the lands
therein were not platted; that there were no residence
properties therein; and that the territory sought to be
severed was not needed for the future growth of the city
or town." (citations omitted.)
Another pertinent case is Brooks v. City of South
Sioux Falls (S.D. 1955) 73 N.W. 2d 339, in which the
petitioners sought exclusion from the defendant city of
an entire section of land except for a sixty-acre triangular
tract. The land was agricultural and had not been laid
out into blocks or lots; there were no streets or alleys in
the area. The city had no municipal water or sewer system, although a water system had been planned. It had
a volunteer fire department and a police department. Its
street department had modern road machinery and equipment. The area in question had received the benefits of
the foregoing services. Between 1945 and 1950, the city's
increase was 13 7 7(l. The trend of construction was in the
direction of the excluded area. Residential development
in the area had reached the point where a number of
homes had been built along the street bordering the area
on the east side. None of the recent construction had been
on the tract in question.
Defendant city, South Sioux Falls, and the City of
Sioux Falls are continguous municipalities with the latter
being north of the former. Their streets appeared to be
continuations of each other. Much of the area in the tract
in question was level and usable for residential purposes.
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The court held:
The undisputed evidence in this record impels the
conclusion that much of the excluded area east of
the river is reasonably needed by the city for residential territory and will likely be used for that
purpose in the near future. It seems to us that the
exclusion of this part of the area does an injustice
to the remaining portion of the city. That the
eastern part of the excluded area, whether it is in
or out of the city, will be occupied by residences in
the near future seems inevitable. It would be an
injustice to the inhabitants of the city and close
proximity thereto to have such development take
place with this area freed of municipal building
regulations and other restrictions designed to
promote the public welfare, safety and comfort.
These views require a reversal of the judgment
entered and make unnecessary the consderation of
the other propositions urged by appellant.
Another pertinent decision is Iowa Power and Light
Co. v. Incorporated Town of Pleasant Hill (Iowa 1962)
112 N.W. 2d 304. Here the municipalities of Pleasant
Hill and Des Moines adjoined each other, and plaintiff
sought to have its plant disconnected from the defendant
and included within the boundaries of Des Moines. Plaintiff's reason for asking severance and annexation to Des
Moines was so as to effect a more equitable distribution
of its tax money among its customers, and plaintiff had
carried on extensive negotiations with the city council
of Des Moines to that end. Had it been able to get into
Des Moines and out of Pleasant Hill, there was a good
possibility that a franchise tax would be reduced or
waived.
11

The court found that plaintiff had failed to show
that defendant was incapable of providing the municipal
services normally needed in the territory sought to be severed. The court said:
The evidence shows the defendant is capable,
rather than incapable, of extending into the territory to be severed substantial municipal services
and benefits that the territory would not enjoy if
severed. The statute does not authorize us to sever
the territory for the purpose of being annexed by
Des Moines or consider the services or benefits ....
The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
remanded the case with directions to dismiss plaintiff's
petition, with the result that the territory remained in the
defendant town.
Under a Pennsylvania statute a petition was filed for
detachment of an area of some 350 acres of Indiana township and for its annexation to Shaler Township. In re
Alteration of Lines of Indiana and Shaler Townships (Pa.
1953) 95 A.2d 506. The court appointed commissioners
who held a hearing and filed a report recommending that
the petition be granted and a new boundary line established as prayed for.
In its opinion the court said:
Where, however, the avowed purpose to be accomplished is to detach from the one political subdivision a substantial portion of its territory and to
annex it to the other, the reason for the change
being based on some such consideration as relative
school facilities, questions of taxation and assessed valuation of property, social conveniences, or
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the like, the proceeding becomes obviously one of
annexation and the alteration in the boundary line
merely incidental to the accomplishment of the
larger object.
The court in concluding pointed out that the statute
under which the petition was filed was one for changing
boundaries between townships, but could not be used to
effect a de-annexation from one township and an annexation by the other, and it affirmed the trial court in holding that the attempted severance and annexation were
of no effect.
Again, the reasons for allowing disconnection of
territory not only in Utah but elsewhere are that the land
is agricultural and unplatted and does not receive and
does not need municipal benefits, or the land is improved
and developed and is not being or cannot be served by
the city. None of these conditions exist here.
In its ruling from the bench, made a part of the
findings of fact in this case, the district court relied heavily on the preference of the owner, stating that he should
be allowed to develop in whichever municipality he chose.
This ruling as a matter of law is erroneous. There is not
a single precedent either in Utah law or any case from any
other state known to the city's counsel or submitted to the
court by petitioner's counsel which supports hat decision.

r
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POINT

II.

THE LAND IN QUESTION IS NOT SUBJECT TO DISCONNECTION UNDER ANY OF THE TESTS PREVIOUSLY USED BY THIS COURT.
As is pointed out above, the decisions of this court
have affirmed disconnection only where land is either
built up, improved and needing services and the city is
unable to supply them; or is agricultural, receiving no
benefits but burdened by taxes, unplatted, and not likely
to be needing municipal services in the future. The land
in question will not qualify under a single one of these
criteria.
It is not agricultural land. Petitioner's counsel said
in his opening statement, "It is just farm land" (T. 10: 17),

and petitioner testified it had only been used to raise "a
little wheat and oats and things like that" before he
started building homes on it (T.36:3). He also said,
when skillfully led by counsel, that the eighty acres in
question was "still agricultural land" (T.36: 13). One
cannot help asking, Is he serious? Those statements,
some thirty or so words, are not very convincing when
matched against the entire remainder of the record of 209
pages and some tens of thousands of words, the net upshot of which is that the land in question is prime residential (or commercial [T.20: 15]) development land, already platted and ready to be built on.
Some examples will illustrate this. The petition itself asks severance so that the land can be developed
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(R-2), not farmed or let go to weeds. Petitioner had his
engineer plan an outfall sewer line to serve the residences which will be built on the subject land (T. 27: 16;
T.93: 1-7), and that line is in the ground. The underground electrical power and telephone lines are all installed (T.27:5). Petitioner testified he is a developer
(T.17: 16-30), and he purchased the property for residential or commercial development (T.20:9-18). There
are 480 lots planned to go into the subdivision, not counting the townhouse area (Exhibit F). All of the land has
been platted since 1966 or 1967 (T.55:27), and a plat of
11 lots has been recorded (T.18: 17). The area was a most
attractive one for building at the time he acquired it
(T.18:27) and had been so at least since 1960 (T.18:24);
R-53 [attached minutes]). He said the principal purpose
of the land was residential (T.35:29 to T.36: 1), and that
"it is a natural area here, it is a very beautiful area and
can be developed into a very nice residential area" (T.
44: 17). His investment in the land is something over
$400,000 (T.45:24), and he's in it to sell units at a profit
and then get out (T.51: 12 to T.52: 11). That doesn't
sound much like agricultural land.
Nor is this land unplatted. Something has already
been mentioned about this above, but a better idea of just
how platted it is can be gathered from an examination of
Exhibit F. Additionally, there is the petitioner's testimony at T.18:9-20, T.27:3, and T.25:25. Although no
plat of the tract within Layton City has been recorded,
the whole 160 acres has been divided into 480 lots and a
townhouse area. Topographical maps have been made,
15

the streets have been laid out with their elevations, the
major utilities except water are in, and the engineering
has been done for construction of roads, and installation
of the other off-site improvements. Everything necessary
to subdivide the land and develop it has been done except
for recording the final plats, in small sections, as the work
progresses (T.24: 10, 27). This land will not qualify as
unplatted land.
Does the land fail to receive benefits commensurate
with the taxes? Petitioner fluffed off the amount of the
taxes by saying he was sure they were under $500 (T.
36:30). And he admitted on cross-examination that the
land in question really had no need for any benefits up to
now (T.60: 13).
The fallacy in plaintiff's entire position in the district court becomes evident at this point. He states he
ought to be allowed to take his ground out of Layton City
because it's agricultural land and not receiving any benefits. In the next breath he says he's got to get the land
disconnected because it's prime residential land, and he's
got to have benefits immediately. He says further that he
wants to develop it in only one municipality, and he wants
to get on with it and he's being delayed. He admits that
the ground has heretofore had no need for subdivision
services. Even so, he says, he's now ready to develop in a
big way and wants to move with dispatch, and Layton
City has not been very quick to jump in and help him.
Moreover, he claims, Layton City cannot help him. Let's
see how much opportunity he gave Layton City to help
him and whether or not the city is in a position to do so,
16

POINT

III.

THE PETITIONER NEVER REQUESTED ASSISTANCE NOR COOPERATION FROM LAYTON CITY,
AND PLANNED FROM THE OUTSET TO PROCEED
WITHOUT CONSULTING THE CITY.
In 1961, when his father-in-law owned the ground,
petitioner may have had an open mind about whether and
how Layton City might help get water and sewer to the
ground. But after he and his associates acquired the land
in 1965, he made no genuine approach to Layton City
about supplying services to it. What he ostensibly did in
this regard was window-dressing.
Regarding his first contact with the city in 1961, he
testified that he met with Layton City officials and told
them what he had in mind for the ground. They in turn
showed him the maps of roads and utility services in the
area and told him what the city's plans were for future
development (T.18:24 to T.19:8). This comports with
the minutes of the Layton City Planning Commission
meeting of July 19, 1961 (R. 53). There is really no dispute to that point.
But petitioner says he went back in 1968 and talked
with the city engineer, who was acting for the city, and
that official turned a deaf ear to him (T.30:4-30; T.33: 17
to T.35: 10). Yet on cross-examination, he admitted he
had never had his engineer take his plans and drawings to
Layton City, had never submitted anything in writing to
Layton City, and had never asked Layton City to supply
17

any services to his ground (T.58, 59; T. 103:17; T.106:
10). He and his engineer knew that part of his land was
in Layton City (T.66:8; T.103: 14), and that the sewer system was designed to handle not only the tract in question
but a lot of additional ground which is part of Layton
City (T.63:24; T.93:3; T.103:21; T.104:1).
But even more significant are these facts:
1. Petitioner filed his petition for disconnection on
March 25, 1968, but his plat for annexation to East Layton
Town was prepared at least a month earlier, in February
1968 (Exhibit B).
2. Petitioner made his decision to try to disconnect
the eighty acres in question immediately after he hired
his engineer to design some alternative sewer systems,
at the very latest in the latter part of 1965. His engineer
gave a very candid answer on this point, notwithstanding
counsel's artful objection to stall for time (T.104:4-26):
Q.

So that is when he mentioned this disconnection of part of this territory, before he even
started talking to you about sewer.

MR. GIAQUE:

I object to that.

THE COURT:

He may ask.

A.

He mentioned that at one time and I can't
answer whether it was at the beginning or
later on. I think it was probably a little later.

Q.

I see. Do you know about how much later it
would have been?
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A.

Probably about the time we told him how
much the costs would be when we finished
the study.

Q.

Two or three months after he first consulted you?

A.

Probably yes, around two or three months.

Q.

So this would be sometime in the late part of
1965?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And, at that time he was considering disconnection of this parcel from the city?

A.

I don't know whether he was definitely or
not.

Q.

Well, he mentioned it to you at that time?

A.

He said this was a possibility, as I remember
it.

3. Petitioner's engineer never recommended to him
that he see Layton City about cooperation on the development (T.106:10), and the development plan which that
engineer submitted to his municipal client, East Layton
Town, showed one alternative for the town's outfall
sewer line as running through petitioner's land, with no
involvement from Layton City (Exhibit H). This was in
1965. And that's the plan which was adopted by East
Layton Town.
4. The engineering specifications and drawings
were proceeded with and the contract was let in 1966 and
1967 (T.32:29).

19

So, any claim of a good faith contact with the Layton City Engineer for help on this project is certainly not
truthful. Petitioner's testimony in this respect is just not
believable. He brought no maps or plats with him to the
meeting. His brief contact with the Layton City Engineer
was so superficial that the engineer thought he was a
real estate man (T.180: 19 to T.181: 13). The only purpose petitioner could have had for that 1968 contact was
to set up Layton City for a claim of disinterest so as to
facilitate disconnection. It is a contrived claim.
In this same category is petitioner's claim of the insuperable difficulties attendant on developing the same
project in two municipalities. He went on at length about
this, and so did his engineer. All of it is speculation and
opinion; none of it is based on experience or fact. There
is not one solid piece of competent evidence in the record
that supports this hobgoblin, and there is a great deal
of evidence to the contrary.

For example: Petitioner's statements of development
problems in two municipalities (T.22:7; T.40: 18 to T.
42: 16) is contradicted by his statement that he'd never
had the problem (T.42: 17), that he assumed Layton City
would charge higher sewer connection fees but no one
had told him that was so (T.57:9), and that cooperative
agreements between municipalities would remove his ob·
jections (T.61:18 to T.62:3). He admitted he had no
evidence that the building standards for the two munici·
palities were different (T.59:6-13). Again, his engineer's
testimony that sewer lift stations don't work well and are
expensive (T.86:21 to T.88:5) is offset by his testimony
20

that two of the three systems he designed for petitioner
were lift station systems T.85:15), and he has designed
them for other clients and they work well (T.108:16).
His testimony that engineers can't coordinate their work,
and that standards are different (T.95:27 to T.98: 1) is
contradicted by his admission that the loop water system
he had described earlier would be stronger if Layton City
water came in from the north (T.108:26 to T.109:7), and
that roads can be adjusted so as to alleviate boundary
problems (T.110: 18).
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Layton City witnesses identified, and there were admitted into evidence, Exhibit 3 which is a fire protection
agreement between Layton City and East Layton Town
and is similar to one between these municipalities covering the prior four years (T.144:17), Exhibit 2 which is a
copy of minutes of the meeting in which a road maintenance agreement between the two municipalities was
approved, and Exhibit 4 which is a resolution authorizing
expenditure of Layton City funds for services to the tract
in question.
The East Layton Town president testified that the
fire agreement worked satisfactorily (T.174:1 and see
T.40: 14), that the Fairfield Street maintenance agreement had a problem about paving but that Layton City
hadn't been notified of it yet, and that one purpose of the
proposed interconnection of the two municipal water systems was to alleviate the expense burden on East Layton
Town for water which it could not use (T.174:25). He
knew of no reason why the sewer and water systems
couldn't be interconnected unless it was the expense fac21

tor for Layton City residents, for the out-of-town charge.
He testified of no other problem in developing petitioner's land in two municipalities, and no one is in a better
position to know than he is.
The Layton City Engineer, Byron McGregor, testified that many municipalities operate under cooperative
agreements to handle developed property on their com·
mon boundaries (T.188: 13), and that the cost of putting
the facilities in the ground on the tract in question is the
same no matter whose water is in the pipe (T.197: 18). He
further testified that an out-of-town charge for Layton
City residents is no probelm, since the City can afford to
absorb the charge if it doesn't have to invest in a sewer
line.
Upon analysis then, it is clear that petitioner never
intended or tried to develop his ground through Layton
City, but assumed that he would disconnect it. His claim
that Layton City was not interested in his ground and that
it is impossible to develop in two municipalities simply
won't wash.
POINT

IV.

LAYTON CITY IS BOTH WILLING AND CAPABLE
OF PROVIDING NEEDED MUNICIPAL SERVICES
TO THE EIGHTY-ACRE TRACT.
Layton City, with a population of 13,621, is the
second largest city in Davis County. It has a growth rate
of 5 7 % since the 1960 census. (T .171: 7). The tract in
question is located about three miles from the business
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area of Layton City (T.29:16-19) and about one and onehalf miles from the nearest large residential subdivision
in Layton (T.29:30). Layton City has two separate water
systems, one located east of the tract in question, at a
higher elevation, and one to the north and west of the
tract. The first system has a million-gallon storage reservoir which serves the higher elevations of the city (T.182,
183), and an additional million-gallon capacity is being
built into that system. There is an eight-inch water line
running east from the intersection of Church Street and
Syracuse Road (marked in red on Exhibit E) which can
serve the tract in question, and is only 400 ft. from it.
(T.184:3-10). The line has plenty of pressure, pumping
would be unnecessary (T.184: 14). Additionally, the city
has Hill Field water reservoir which stores a million gallons, two wells which deliver 3,400 gallons per minute,
and a storage reservoir on East Gentile Street with a million and a half gallon storage capacity. It has a fourth
storage reservoir of three-quarters of a million gallons
capacity on the Mountain Road, and a fifth storage tank
of one quarter million gallons on the mountain slope
east of the tract in question (T.185).
So, the city has water storage of five and one-half
million gallons located on three sides of the property,
and an eight-inch water line within 400 ft. of the property. That line, incidnetally, has never been out of service (T.183:14), although petitioner recalled that it had
(T.33:26). East Layton Town, on the other hand, has a
ten-inch water line whose closest point to the land in
question is about 900-1,000 ft. (Exhibit E by scale). It is
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clear, then, that Layton City is closer to the property with
water and is fulJy able to serve it. It is also willing to
serve it (Exhibit 4). The reason it has not moved to do so
is simply that it has never been asked (T.185:13-20; T.
191:29 to T.192:1-17).
The same is true of the sewer (T.193:24). Layton
City has never been requested to cooperate with petition·
er in bringing the sewer to the tract. The nearest Layton
City sewer is about 900 ft. from the tract (Exhibit E, scale).
This line would be necessary for a gravity sewer line to
serve the northwest portion of the tract in question, since
it is on the other side of a ridge (T.194:19) and could not
be served by the petitioner-East Layton Town outfall line
to the south without the use of a lift station (T.67:29 to
T.68:23). If disconnection is denied, it is quite likely that
a cooperative use agreement will be entered into between
Layton City and East Layton Town for us of the outfall
line to serve the residences in Layton City (T.188: 13;
T.200: 13). These municipalities have cooperated on
other projects to their mutual advantage. But even if such
did not come to pass, a sewage lift station would serve
the tract in question on the south slope (T.187:8-23).
If the tract were built up and improved by petition·
er, all municipal services and facilities would be available
from Layton City to the residents of the tract, including
water, sewer, police protection, fire protection, library,
ambulance service, garbage pickup, street lighting, street
maintenance, storm sewer drainage, parks, recreational
facilities including swimming pool, tennis courts, and
baseball and football leagues (T.148, 149). Layton City
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has, in its long-range planning, expended money in preparation for the facilities which would be installed in and
used to serve the tract in question (T.186: 12-27; T.188:
2-12). This tract is necessary to the future growth and
development of Layton City (T.171:23).
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By contrast, East Layton Town into which the tract
proposed to be severed would go, has 743 people (T.177:
24). Its business district is a cafe and service station on
Highway 89 (T.177:25; T.133:27) located about one and
one-half to two miles from the tract in question (T.134:3).
The town has no fire department; its fire protection comes
from Layton City under contract. It has no police department; any police protection it gets is through Davis
County, headquartered at Farmington. It contracts its
garbage pickup through a private contractor. Davis
County does its street repair under contract. It has no
parks, no recreation facilities. It has no library (T.53,
54; T.124 to T.126).
Most interesting is the eagerness of the East Layton
Town officers to get this ground out of Layton City and
into their unprepared but lately ambitious town. And
why not? The total increase would add over 2,000 souls
(three times what they now have), of which half would
be on the tract in question in this suit. A fine prize! The
town's officers denied they were banking on the ground's
being brought in so as to make their town solvent, but
their testimony is suspect in light of their statements about
tax base. First, Mr. Mohler (T.122:20):
A.

Well, of course, it is growth for us and the
fact that the south portion was developed, the
25

~ewer and water lines were put in with the
Intent to develop the entire area. Of course
it i~ th~ tax bas~ ground and the growth
which 1s the desirable thing to us.

and again at T.123:8:

Q.

And, East Layton Town wants this develop.
ment within its city?

A.

Absolutely, yes. We put a lot of effort in with
Mr. Sawyer since 1965, of course. We cer·
tainly do want it.

Then Mr. Follett (T.179:5-13):
A.

I assume he will apply for annexation and I
won't be a bit surprised if he were annexed.
I couldn't say for sure because each member
of the board has his own vote.

Q.

You would want that though, wouldn't you?

A.

Yes, I would.

Q.

It wouldn't be economically feasible for East
Layton Town to supply water and sewer to
this other parcel unless it had the revenue
from that other parcel, isn't that correct?

A.

Yes, that is correct.

Layton City, though one and one-half years younger
than East Layton Town, did not grow to eighteen times
the size of the town by being indifferent to developers and
subdividers, and ignoring their needs. It has established
procedures for working with them, and those procedures
have served well both the developers and the city (T.157:
24; T.160:5; T.169:23 to T-170:15; T.189:21; T.190:1;
T.199:17-28; and T.191:9). But it is difficult for a city
26

to help a developer if he ignores the city. In this connection, there was much smoke from petitioner's counsel in
the cross-examination of the city's witnesses, calculated to
create the impression that petitioner had contacted Layton
City numerous times. Not so. Those questions and
answers relate to compromise conferences, held after the
petition was filed, after petitioner had made his plans and
completely bypassed the city. Petitioner himself admitted
this, and it was confirmed by his engineer and by all the
Layton City witnesses. As is more fully developed in Point
III above, petitioner brought no plans to the city, filed
nothing with the city, and spent only ten or fifteen minutes with its engineer. Layton City didn't ignore him;
he ignored Layton City.
Which brings us to an overall perspective of the
entire situation.

SUMMARY
Petitioner owns a 160-acre tract of choice residential
development land, divided in half by the common boundary line between Layton City and East Layton Town. Layton City, with a population of 13,621, a building and
engineering department experienced in working with developers, a complete water system with adequate pressure,
a sewer system recently expanded in the direction of
the tract, and a full range of municipal services and facilities, is capable and willing to serve the tract which lies
within its boundaries. But East Layton Town wants the
Layton City part of the tract transferred into East Layton
Town because it has spent money to take water and sewer

27

to its side of the tract, and the financial commitment on
the bonds is considerable. The town's officers made the
decision to install the water and sewer lines to serve the
petitioner's land one year after its citizens had turned
down a bond issue in an election, and they made that decision on the recommendation of their newly hired consulting engineer, who by coincidence turned out to be the
engineer for the developer, too. Getting the eighty acres
from Layton City, with its 240 plus residential units and
its thousand or so people would do a lot for the town's
tax base.
But if the tract were taken from Layton City and put
into East Layton Town, where would the residents get fire
proection? From Layton City. And police protection?
From Davis County. And street repair? From Davis
County. And all the other municipal services? From
somewhere other than East Layton Town. Those people
will play golf in the Layton City park. Their children
will swim in the Layton City pool. Their young people
will play tennis on the Layton City courts. They all will
find interesting books in the Layton City library. The
parents will travel to and from stores on roads built and
maintained by Layton City. The young people will at·
tend schools with those from the other Layton City sub·
divisions, such as Aspen East with its 150 homes. Most
by far of the commercial, recreational, educational and
social ties of these people will be with Layton City, its
people, its stores and institutions. Those people who will
live on the land in question belong in Layton City.
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CONCLUSION
The findings and decree of the trial court are not
supported by the evidence. The evidence, and fair inferences therefrom, preponderate the other way. Additionally, the court applied an erroneous concept of the law
to the facts which may be fairly found. The tract should
remain in and be served by Layton City. The decree of
the district court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
K. ROGER BEAN
Bean, Bean & Smedley
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